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VIII. CABLE AND SUBSCRIPTION TELEVISION
A. Sellers of Decoder Boxes Enjoined
Home Box Office, ("HBO") is a Pay-TV service that provides a
variety of motion pictures, sporting events and other entertainment
programs. Many of these programs are unavailable on commercial
television. In addition, HBO's programs do not contain commercial
advertisements.'
In the New York City area HBO transmits its programs through
underground cable and through the air via microwave signal. This
case deals with microwave signals. Microwave signals cannot be re-
ceived on conventional television sets without supplemental equip-
ment. One receives the HBO programming by having a special
antenna that picks up the high frequency MDS signal. A down con-
verter changes the frequency into a signal that a conventional television
can receive. The antenna and down converter are supplied to HBO
and its affiliates for their customers who pay a monthly fee.
The Advanced Consumer Technology, ("ACT") manufactures an
antenna and down converter that enables purchasers to receive the
MDS signal on conventional television sets. This equipment is techno-
logically simple and can be installed by the purchaser.3 ACT was sell-
ing this equipment throughout the United States, until a California
statute outlawed their activities and the District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted a temporary injunction. In filing for a
permanent injunction HBO alleged defendants activities violated Sec-
tion 605 of the Communications Act,4 the federal copyright and trade-
mark acts and various state laws. In Home Box Office, Inc. v. Advanced
Consumer Technology, Movie Antenna, Inc. ,5 the court granted a per-
manent injunction against ACT from manufacturing, selling or adver-
tising equipment that was used to intercept HBO's signal without
paying the subscription CoStS. 6 Since the court decided ACT's activities
violated Section 605 that court did not address the other claims.7
I. Home Box Office, Inc. v. Advanced Consumer Technology, Movie Antenna, Inc.,
549 F. Supp. 14, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
2. Id
3. Id at 15-16.
4. 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (Supp. 1983).
5. 549 F. Supp. 14.
6. 1d. at 25.
7. 1d. at 16.
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In deciding to grant a permanent injunction, the court decided
ACT's activities violated Section 605 of the Communications Act of
1934.
Section 605 provides in pertinent part that no unauthorized person
"shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate or foreign communi-
cation . . . for his own benefit or for the benefit of another entitled
thereto."' ACT undoubtedly assisted others in receiving interstate com-
munication for its benefit. Nevertheless, ACT claimed that the part of
the statute that states, "shall not apply to the receiving, divulging, pub-
fishing, or utilizing the contents of any radio communication which is
broadcast or transmitted by amateur or others for the use of the general
public,"9 removed its conduct from the Section 605 prohibition. ACT,
thus alleged that HBO's transmission was broadcast for general
consumption.o
In light of recent technological advances, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission ("FCC") has concluded that the unauthorized inter-
ception of MDS's broadcast does violate Section 605." The courts
have nevertheless, construed the meaning of Section 605 independent
of the FCC's judgment. The court's decisions have been predomi-
nantly consistent with the FCC,' 2 though the court in Ortho-O- Vision,
Inc. v. Home Box Office, concluded in dictum that HBO's programs are
broadcasting and not protected by Section 605.1" To decide if HBO's
programs were intended for the general public required the HBO v. Act
court to review the history of Section 605.
Section 605 originated as Regulation 19 of Section 4 of the Radio
Act of 1912.14 The Act was Congress's first major attempt to regulate
the radio industry.' 5 First, the statute set up the pattern for allocating
for radio frequencies. Second, the act required all radio operators to be
8. 47 U.S.C. § 605.
9. 549 F. Supp. at 17. The 1982 Amendments substituted "any station for amateurs or
others." Communications Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-259, § 126, 96 Stat.
1087, 1099 (1982).
10. 549 F. Supp. at 17.
11. Id
12. See Nat'l Subscription Television v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1981);
Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1980); Home Box
Office, Inc. v. Pay TV of Greater New York, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 525 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
13. 474 F. Supp. 672, 682 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The importance of that dictum is ques-
tionable since the court granted the full injunctive relief HBO requested on Copyright Act
Grounds. See Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbook, 637 F.2d at 466 n.4.
14. Pub. L. No. 62-264 § 4, reg. 19, 37 Stat. 302 (1912).
15. 549 F. Supp. at 17.
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licensed by the Department of Commerce and Labor, I6 and placed re-
strictions on the nature and character of radio transmission. The most
important aspect of this act as it applied to this litigation involved con-
fidentiality of communication. 7 Because of the newness of the radio
industry and the lack of available equipment, unauthorized intercep-
tion or reception of radio broadcast was not addressed in this act.'
8
The Radio Act of 1927' 9 was designed to remedy many of the
problems caused by the rapid expansion of the radio industry. This
Act established the Federal Radio Commission (hereinafter "FRC")
and gave it broad authority to control almost all aspects of the radio
industry, from granting licenses, deciding permissible power levels and
operating times to assigning frequencies and determining the nature of
services that each class of station would provide.2°
This new statute incorporated the same provision against disclo-
sure as the previous act. In addition, this new statute added broader
provisions regarding authorized interception and reception of radio
communication. 2' Because of the rapidly growing radio industry, an
exception to the provision was added to "allow transmission, by broad-
casters and others who sought to reach the general public, to be inter-
cepted and received without violating federal law."22
In 1934, a new comprehensive Communication Act was devised.
All of the regulating power that had been granted to many agencies,
including the FRC was delegated to the FCC. The stated purpose of
the 1934 Act was to regulate radio and wire communication in order to
provide the people of the United States with "rapid, efficient, Nation-
wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at
reasonable charges."' 23 Section 27 of the Radio Act of 1927 became Sec-
tion 605 of the 1934 Act.24 There were minor changes but Section 605
is otherwise the same today.25
In response to the numerous requests for frequency assignment for
16. Id at 17-18.
17. Id at 18.
18. Id
19. Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
20. 549 F. Supp. at 18.
21. Id
22. Id at 19. Section 27 of the Radio Act of 1927 also provided "that this section shall
not apply to the receiving, divulging, publishing, or utilizing the contents of any radio com-
munications broadcasted or transmitted by amateurs or others for the use of the general
public .. " Pub. L. No. 69-632, supra, note 19.
23. 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1962).
24. 549 F. Supp. at 19.
25. Id at 20. Cf. note 9, supra.
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closed circuit television service the FCC proposed to establish a new
service called Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS) to allow common
carriers26 to make closed circuit television available to their customers.
The new MDS rules were finally established January, 1974.27
The court in this case stated that "(t)he legislative and regulatory
history of Section 605 refutes [ACT's] argument that HBO's transmis-
sions should be seen as intended for the general public within the
meaning of the proviso of Section 605. "128 Because HBO's programs
can be received by equipment that is readily available to the public
does not deprive HBO of Section 605's protection. Since the Radio Act
of 1912,29 until now, Congress has tried to protect transmissions that
are easy to intercept. "Section 605 has long been interpreted to pro-
hibit unauthorized interception and disclosure without regard to the
technical difficulties involved.
30
As the court noted, wiretaps were not permitted to be used as evi-
dence in criminal prosecutions because gathering the information was
accomplished in violation of Section 605. 3' The availability of inex-
pensive equipment to accomplish such result did not make the conduct
more permissible.32
ACT argued that HBO should scramble its signal. Yet, the legisla-
tive history of Section 605 does not suggest that Congress meant only to
protect persons who took affirmative conduct to keep their signals from
being intercepted.33 Aside from the fact that scrambling a signal would
be costly to HBO and consequently its subscribers,34 scrambling is no
guarantee of signal security.
35
26. The definition of common carrier in the 1934 Act provides, in part, that "a person
engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a
common carrier." 47 U.S.C. § 153(h); 549 F. Supp. at 19.
27. Id. at 20. See Docket No. 19493, F.C.C. 74-34, 45 F.C.C.2d 616.
28. Id. at 21.
29. See note 14 supra.
30. 549 F. Supp. at 21.
31. Id., citing, Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939) and Nardone v. United
States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
32. Id
33. Id
34. To keep the high quality reception required by Microband a new transmitter would
have to be purchased for $400,000 and a descrambling unit would have to be given to each
subscriber at a cost of up to $150 per person. 549 F. Supp. at 22.
35. As suggested in American Television and Communications Corp. v. Western Tech-
tronics, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 617, 621 (D. Colo. 1981) (a similar case). "Adding scramblers to a
system would only provide the defendants a new product market, since they could simply
begin to sell decoders in addition to antennas and down converters. Scrambling their MDS
system would be a futile act." Id at 621.
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ACT also contended that HBO is not entitled to protection be-
cause its programs are similar to conventional television. However,
HBO's programs are provided without commercial advertisements and
are often time shows that are not available to commercial channels.
More importantly, the statutory language and legislative history of Sec-
tion 605 does not require transmission to be unique.36 Although HBO
would like to reach as wide an audience as possible, this does not mean
that HBO intended its signal for the general public. Therefore, the
court reasoned that ACT was not exempt from Section 605'S3 1 prohibi-
tion against unauthorized users.
The court in KMLA Broadcasting Corp. v. Twentieth Century Ciga-
rette Vendors Corp. , found that defendants violated Section 605 by
distributing equipment that allowed purchasers to receive radio broad-
casts that were specially for paid subscribers.39
In Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook,4 a subscription
television service was held not to be broadcasting because it was in-
tended for paying customers. The only contrary authority is Orth-O-
Vision, where the court found HBO's broadcasts were intended for the
general public. This decision was based on the fact that the program-
ming was similar to commercial television.4 ' It should be noted
though, this was only dicta in the case and unnecessary to the disposi-
tion of the case. According to a note in Chartwell, the conclusion in
Orth-O- Vision is undercut by the fact that the court granted the injunc-
tion to HBO on copyright grounds.42
The FCC stance is that MDS signals are not "broadcast" and are
therefore within the protection of Section 605. 4" The history of the
FCC regulations of MDS transmission reveal that it "expected and re-
quired MDS to be used for restricted access transmission." . . . To al-
low defendants, or any other person or group, to intercept MDS
transmission, would defeat this purpose.""
This case is important because it extensively reviews the evolution
of Section 605 and how it applies to the interception of television
36. 549 F. Supp. at 22.
37. Id at 23.
38. 264 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
39. Id. at 44.
40. 637 F.2d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 1980).
41. See note 13, supra.
42. 637 F.2d at 466, n.4.
43. 549 F. Supp. at 24.
44. Id at 24-25.
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waves. Through the court's analysis, the importance of protecting sig-
nals is shown. Further, the granting of, a permanent injunction rein-
forces the courts view of putting an end to interception of television
signals. This ruling, along with other cases, will aid the Pay-TV indus-
try in protecting itself. Obviously if people are able to intercept and
effectively "steal" a signal, they are not going to pay for the Pay-TV
service. If this were to continue, Pay-TV would see its demise from an
economic standpoint.
Aside from helping the Pay-TV field, these types of decisions pro-
tect copyright owners who receive their royalties based on the number
of subscribers they have. In turn, if copyright holders are paid what
they are owed, they can pay the investors and performers who have
"points."
In American Television & Communications, Corp. v. Western Tech-
tronics, Inc. ,'45 the court continued the trend of enjoining sellers of de-
coder boxes. The court held the defendant sellers were enjoined from
selling any electronic devices which could be used to intercept the
plaintiff's programming. The motion for a preliminary injunction was
granted and was to continue in full force until a trial on the merits was
had.46
Plaintiff, American Television (ATC) is the licensed distributor of
Home Box Office (HBO) in the Denver, Colorado area. ATC pays
HBO a monthly fee for the rights to distribute HBO's programs. HBO
transmits its programming by common carrier and satellite to ATC in
Denver. After ATC receives the wave it transmits the programs by
common carrier microwave to the top of Lookout Mountain, just west
of Denver. From Lookout Mountain HBO's programming is distrib-
uted to subscribers by Microvision, another common carrier. Microvi-
sion in turn is licensed by the FCC to operate a Multipoint Distribution
Service (MDS) in Denver.47
Standard TV receivers cannot receive the MDS Microwave trans-
mission, so ATC provides its subscribers with a special microwave an-
tenna and a "down converter." This equipment makes the signal
available on a standard television. ATC subscribers pay for the equip-
ment, installation and a monthly subscription fee for a HBO program-
ming. ATC only rents the antenna and the down converter to its
customers.48
45. 529 F. Supp. 617 (1982).
46. Id. at 622.
47. Id. at 618.
48. Id.
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ATC claimed that the defendants advertised and sold microwave
antennae, down converters and components with instructions on how
to intercept the MDS signal without paying the subscription fees. ATC
alleged that the sole purpose of the defendants devices was to enable
their customers to pirate the HBO programs without paying for them.
ATC filed for a preliminary injunction against the defendants to stop
them from selling these devices until after a trial on the merits.49
The defendants in this case did not dispute that they advertised
and sold this type of equipment to intercept ATC's transmissions. In-
stead, they contended that the interception of ATC's transmission was
legal.5" Defendants argued that (1) the MDS transmissions were in-
tended for public use and consequently could be intercepted; (2) ATC
had no standing to sue since they were HBO's licensee and ATC's con-
tract with Microband had expired; (3) ATC did not show defendants
actually deprived ATC of customers; (4) ATC has an adequate remedy
at law for damages or could provide their own remedy by scrambling
their MDS signal; (5) no injunction could be issued since ATC has not
established the boundaries of its service area; and (6) an injunction
would hurt defendant more than plaintiff-ATC.5"
In deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction there were
several criteria the court had to consider.52 The first of these criteria
was whether ATC would probably prevail on the merits.53 ATC based
its claim on 47 U.S.C. § 605 which states in part:
No person not being entitled thereto shall receive or as-
sist in receiving any interstate or foreign communication by
radio and use such communication (or any information
therein contained) for his own benefits or for the benefit of
another not entitled thereto. . . . This section shall not apply
to the receiving, divulging, publishing, or utilizing the con-
tents of any radio communication which is broadcast or trans-
mitted by amateurs or others for the use of the general public
54
The court followed the decision by stating that Section 605 did create a
private right of action.
55
49. Id. at 619.
50. Id
51. Id
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Chartwell Communications Group v. Westbrook, 637 F.2d 459, 466 (6th Cir. 1980).
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The court continued by adopting ATC's position that the defend-
ants selling of microwave antennae and down converters together with
instructions on how to use this equipment to tune in HBO amounted to
actually assisting their customers in unlawfully receiving HBO signals
to which the customers were not entitled.56
Defendants argued that MDS transmissions were broadcast for the
use of the general public and hence their conduct is not prohibited by
Section 605."7 The court in this case considered the split of authority
regarding the application of Section 605 to MDS signals 58 and con-
cluded that Section 605 prohibits unauthorized interception of MDS
signals.59
The next criteria the court had to decide was whether ATC was the
proper party to bring this suit and whether the expiration of ATC's
contract with Microvision was of any significance. The court con-
cluded neither of these contentions had any merits. "ATC holds the
right to distribute HBO programming in the Denver area, and pays
HBO for that right. This proprietary interest is sufficient to confer
standing on ATC to object to the theft of HBO programming. '6° The
court also decided that there was evidence that the contract was still in
force. For the above stated reasons the court concluded that ATC
demonstrated a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits of this
case.
In deciding to grant a preliminary injunction the court had to de-
cide that ATC had suffered irreparable harm. The court reasoned that
the nature of the receiving equipment along with the size of Denver
made it impossible to discover how many unauthorized units existed.
Additionally, because of possible criminal charges it was highly un-
likely people would come forth to admit they were using these receiv-
ers. "For these reasons, compensatory damages attributable to loss of
subscription fees cannot be accurately ascertained."6 '
Defendants argued that ATC could scramble their signals. The
court responded by suggesting this was not a viable remedy. First, the
court reasoned that this would be a considerable expense for ATC and
consequently its subscribers; and second, the court reasoned this would
provide the defendants with a new product market and ultimately the
56. 529 F. Supp. at 619.
57. Id
58. Id. at 620.
59. Id
60. Id. at 620-21.
61. Id at 621.
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scrambling would be a futile act.62
In short, the court concluded without a preliminary injunction,
ATC would suffer irreparable harm.
"Obviously each equipment sale by the defendants eliminates a
potential paying customer for ATC's service."' 63 As a result of this ac-
tivity the court reasoned that ATC's services would remain higher be-
cause of all of the unauthorized receivers who did not pay the fees.
Defendants argued that an injunction would deprive them of their
livelihood. While the court acknowledged this fact, the court suggested
that "(n)o one, however, has a vested right to earn a living by violating
federal law."
64
Finally, in deciding to grant a motion for preliminary injunction,
the court decided that there was a public interest in the survival of
MDS programming as an option to commercial television. "Defend-
ant's conduct, in addition to being unlawful, hinders the development
of MDS system."65 The reduction of MDS's costs is essential to make
widespread distribution. The court found that an injunction should be
granted because it was in the best interest of the public.
The court granted the motion for preliminary injunction and fur-
ther protected ATC's interest by requiring a total ban on defendant's
activities by enjoining them from selling any device or components
which could be used to intercept ATC's signals. The injunction was
granted until a trial on the merits was held.
This decision reaffirms the courts trend to protect the Pay-TV in-
dustry from "pirates." If the courts do not continue to prevent people
from selling unauthorized receivers, Pay-TV will lose money and possi-
bly go out of business.
As one author suggested, a parasitic relationship exists between
the seller and the manufacturer of decoding devices and down convert-
ers. "The courts have recognized that, left unrestrained, these sellers
will destroy the very industry upon which they depend.
'66
In addition to cable companies losing money, many other people
stand to lose dollars. Copyright owners lose money because the com-
pulsory licensing fees are based on the cable systems receipts from sub-
62. Id
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 622.
66. Bienstock, Theft of Service of Over-the-Air Pay TV Are the Airwaves Free, 56 Fla.
B.J. 240, 244 (1982).
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scribers.67 If there are unauthorized receivers who do not pay
subscription fees there are fewer royalties for copyright owners. Often
times these copyright owners are studios who are making part of the
profits from these royalties. If royalties are not paid, then there are
fewer profits for investors who have "points."6 Though it may appear
that unauthorized reception of MDS signals only hurts Pay-TV, it has
far reaching effects on producers and performers.
The strength of this case is reaffirmed by the fact that in a more
recent case, United States v. Stone,69 criminal charges were directed at
defendants who advertised and sold microwave antennae, down con-
verters and components that allowed for unauthorized reception of
MDS signals."0
As stated in ATC, it is within the public interest that Pay-TV sur-
vive to provide TV viewers with an option.7
Underlying all of these decisions is a moral dilemma. If you can
get something for free, why pay? Intercepting MDS signals is like us-
ing a "black box" to avoid paying telephone bills or lying on your in-
come taxes or not telling a salesclerk they miscalculated your bill. Are
any of these occurrences really stealing? Or can you fault a system or a
person for not being careful?
We are only deceiving ourselves when we ask ourselves, is it really
wrong to intercept TV signals that our neighbors have to pay for? Is it
not likely that if these signals were really for everyone, they would be
for free and special equipment and charges for the programming would
be unnecessary?
Sindee Levin
B. Effect of FCC's Deregulation of Subscrition T V
In 1982 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) made
major changes in the regulations governing the subscription television
industry (STV). The FCC deleted four of its rules for over-the-air sub-
scription television. First, the rule restricting STV operation to com-
munities that had four other conventional television stations was
67. Note, Receive Only Satellite Earth Stations & Piracy of the Airwaves, 58 Notre Dame
L.R. 84, 93 at n.69 (1982).
68. Points are often given to Producers, Directors or performers in lieu of money or in
addition to monies. After the profits are received these points translate into money.
69. 546 F. Supp. 234 (1982).
70. Id. at 236.
71. Id.
[Vol. 4
CABLE AND SUBSCRIPTION TELEVISION
eliminated. Second, the requirement that STV stations broadcast at
least 28 hours per week of conventional programming was deleted.
Third, the Commission allowed either the purchase or lease of STV
decoders by subscribers at the discretion of the STV licensee. Fourth,
the requirement that STV applicants ascertain the needs and interests
of the community in regard to subscription programming was re-
moved.' The deletion of these rules essentially deregulate the subscrip-
tion television service. According to the Commission these restrictions
have inhibited competition and unnecessarily burdened STV licensees
while depriving the public of greater diversity in programming.2
A brief history of subscription television regulation will place the
issues outlined above in perspective. The Commission in 1968 estab-
lished the basis for nationwide over-the-air STV service. It was con-
cluded that STV could provide a beneficial supplement to conventional
television by improving the quality and quantity of overall program-
ming. Until more was known about how STV would develop, the
Commission decided it was best to proceed with caution. Thus, regula-
tions were imposed to maintain the availability of conventional pro-
gramming. STV stations provide both conventional and pay
programming. From sign-on to about 7 p.m. they present conventional
programming much the same as other non-network affiliated stations.
In the pay mode, the signal is scrambled so that only subscribers sup-
plied with a decoder can receive the programming. This pay program-
ming consists of unedited movies, sports and specials.
Several factors have caused the FCC to deregulate the subscrip-
tion television industry, which are discussed below.
The "complement of four" rule was adopted to ensure at least four
conventional signals in a market before STV could be authorized. This
rule was originally employed to assure that conventional "free" televi-
sion would continue to exist. The FCC proposed eliminating this rule
because it was a barrier to STV service in small communities which did
not have four conventional television stations.' There are 139 such
communities in the United States comprising 28 percent of all televi-
sion households.' The FCC has determined that deleting this rule will
allow STV to operate in these areas without squeezing out or blocking
the development of conventional stations. Moreover, many of those
1. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,069 (1982).
2. Id
3. 88 F.C.C.2d 213 (1981).
4. 1980-1981 Television Markets and Rankings Guide, Arbitron Company, Chicago,
Illinois, 1981.
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139 markets would obtain STV service by activating unused UHF allo-
cations, thereby providing a new service where no service was previ-
ously available.
The growth of pay cable and other pay services was another com-
pelling reason to remove these restrictions.5 STV stations which oper-
ate on a single channel are at a disadvantage compared with cable
television which offers multiple channels at a lower cost. It has been
found that pay services which enter a market first have a competitive
advantage over similar types of services which follow. STV's greatest
competitive advantage over cable is the speed with which it can enter
and penetrate a market. The Commission decided that the public is
best served by allowing persons to establish STV stations wherever they
believe a market exist.
Like the "complement of four" rule, the "28 hour" rule was
designed to ensure the availability of conventional, free programming
by requiring STV stations to broadcast at least 28 hours of such pro-
gramming a week. The elimination of this requirement permits STV
stations to forgo all nonscrambled programming. The Commission
ruled that even if STV stations air only subscription programming,
there would be adequate conventional programming available from
non-STV facilities. The FCC concluded that the "28 hour" rule places
an unnecessarily heavy burden on STV stations without concomitant
public benefit. The Commission stated that the rule restricts STV
licensees from exercising independent programming judgments, and it
could prevent efficient programming in response to audience demands.6
The STV licensee is still required to program in response to community
needs and is asked to meet this requirement in either the scrambled or
conventional mode. The Commission felt that community needs for
conventional and pay programming differ from place to place and
those relative needs should be satisfied in the marketplace rather than
by governmental rule.7
Another regulation adopted to protect consumers was the require-
ment that STV equipment be leased and not sold to subscribers.8 It was
believed that such a rule was necessary to protect consumers from
equipment obsolescence and possible cessation of STV services. Now
5. By 1985, 17 percent of television homes are expected to have pay cable, See Wines,
The Cable Revolution-Touch Choices for the Industry and the Government, the Nat'l J., Oc-
tober 24, 1981, at 1891.
6. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,069, 30,073 (1982).
7. Id.
8. See § 73.642(f)(3) of the Commission's Rules.
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the FCC is persuaded that the advantage of allowing STV operators to
sell decoders outweigh the protection provided by its "lease only" rule.
The advantage of selling the decoders are financial, for both STV oper-
ators and their subscribers. The cost of purchasing a decoder may be
no greater than the rental fees subscribers would pay over a two or
three year period. The wholesale cost of decoders range from one hun-
dred to two hundred dollars. Thus, long term subscribers may eventu-
ally save the full cost and more by their initial purchase. Furthermore,
the revenues received by STV companies from the sale of decoders will
provide them with working capital without the interest expense in-
curred when such capital is borrowed.9 Hopefully, these savings will
trickle down to subscribers in the form of lower subscription fees.
Proponents of the "lease only" rule argue that the sale of the de-
coders would aggravate an already serious piracy problem. The FCC
disagreed, stating that those individuals who are capable of duplicating
a decoder may do so by utilizing decoders which were sold or leased to
others. Some opposed the sale of decoders on the grounds that decoder
obsolescence is still a problem requiring consumer protection. The
FCC recognizes that the encoding technology is in a state of flux, how-
ever, it stated that it believes the licensee will offer a decoder owner a
more favorable price on any new decoder that is developed. The Com-
mission concluded that allowing purchase or lease of decoder equip-
ment at the STV operators' discretion can benefit both the businessman
and consumer.'°
Since 1969, applicants for STV authorization have been required
to survey their communities' STV needs and interests and to advise the
FCC how they intend to satisfy such needs. When establishing the ba-
sis for nationwide STV service, the Commission believed that a sub-
stantial amount of STV programming might consist of feature films
and sports with lesser amounts devoted to opera, ballet and theatre."I
Thus, it felt that in ascertaining the community's interest there would
be a search principally directed at what sports and entertainment
should be marketed. However, after observing several STV services in
operation, the FCC decided that the marketplace is the most effective
means to ensure that programming meets the community's needs. The
Commission believes that if an STV operator fails to offer program-
ming that directs itself to the needs and interests of the community,
9. F.C.C. deregulates over-the-air subscription television, 4 Ent. L. Rptr. 4, Sept. 15,
1982.
10. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,069, 30,074 (1982).
11. Fifth Report and Order, 19 F.C.C.2d 559, 566 (1969).
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subscriber support will dwindle. Therefore, the basic economic rela-
tionship between the STV operator and consumer provides sufficient
incentive for that operator to determine its service area's programming
desires. The Commission resolved that the ascertainment requirement
is unnecessary.' 2 It imposes a costly, time consuming burden on the
STV applicant with no benefit accruing to the public.'
3
The Commission anticipates that the deregulation of subscription
television would increase the utilization of unused channels, allow for
additional specialized programming, provide financial support for
small markets and offer a unique service that directly responds to con-
sumer interests. It feels that STV could now effectively compete with
other pay systems that do not operate under similar regulatory re-
straints. The consequence of such competition should result in benefits
to business as well as consumers in the form of greater diversity in
programming.
Presently, the consensus within the subscription television industry
and at the FCC is that the deregulatory action has done little to affect
the prospects of the industry. Cable penetration, operating expenses
and piracy are primary factors hurting the business. Subscription tele-
vision is apparently losing out to cable since STV offers only one chan-
nel at a price that exceeds the price of cable's myriad of services. There
are presently 19 STV stations in operation, eight fewer than last year.
Not a single new STV station was developed since the "complement of
four" rule was relaxed. The national subscriber base has declined from
1,410,000 to 985,000 the year before. 14 Cable subscribers have in-
creased from 27,000,000 to 32,900,000.15 Because of market influences,
several STV operators have ceased their operations. The decision al-
lowing operators to sell decoder boxes to the public has not increased
the piracy problem. However, exact piracy figures are difficult to
calculate.
Deregulatory efforts have not had any material effect on the indus-
try. The problems that exist today are purely economic due to diffi-
culty in competing with cable and other developing technologies.
Diane Tasoff
12. STV applicants when originally applying for their television licenses or the renewal
of them, are obligated to ascertain the community's needs, problems and interest and pro-
gram in a non-entertainment fashion to meet those problems. Nothing in the instant propo-
sal would affect this basic ascertainment requirement.
13. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,069, 30,075 (1982).
14. Broadcasting, Vol. 105, No. 10, September 1983, p. 35.
15. Id.
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C. Cable T V Installation Constitutes a Taking Requiring Just
Compensation
After much litigation involving the cable television market in New
York City, apartment building subscribers may in the future be paying
much more money for the availability of subscription television. In
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. ', the United States
Supreme Court determined that the installation of cable facilities on an
apartment owner's property constitutes a per se compensable taking2
requiring just compensation. Although applied in a novel context, that
of cable television, the Court affirmed "the traditional rule [in eminent
domain law] that a permanent physical occupation of property is a
taking."3
The plaintiff, Jean Loretto, purchased an apartment building in
New York City in 197 .4 At the time of purchase, the defendant Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corporation, with the permission of the
previous owner,5 had already installed cable on the roof of the build-
ing.6 At first, the wiring was only a part of the cable "highway" which
linked the city's buildings.7 However, in 1973, Teleprompter dropped
lines from the roof of the Loretto building to a first floor tenant.' It was
at this time that Loretto first discovered that her building was equipped
1. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
2. Id. at 434. The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides in part:
"[Nlor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
Const. amend. V. A taking, as used in the fifth amendment, has been defined as "entering
upon private property for more than a momentary period and, under the warrant or color of
legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuri-
ously affecting it in such a way as substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment thereof." 26 Am. Jur. 2d § 157 (1966).
3. 458 U.S. at 441.
4. Id at 421.
5. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 124, 135, 423 N.E.2d
320, 324, 440 N.Y.S.2d 843, 847 (1981). In 1968, the previous owner had granted to Tele-
prompter for fifty dollars the right to lay cable on the building and provide exclusive cable
television service to the tenants.
6. Teleprompter placed a cable "slightly less than one-half inch in diameter and of
approximately 30 feet in length along the length of the building about 18 inches above the
roof top, and directional taps, approximately 4 inches by 4 inches, on the front and rear of
the roof. By June 8, 1970 the cable had been extended another 4 to 6 feet and cable had
been run from the directional taps to the adjoining building. ... 53 N.Y.2d 124, 135, 423
N.E.2d 320, 324 440 N.Y.S.2d 843, 847 (1981).
7. 458 U.S. at 421. The cable network in the City was made possible by "crossover"
cable lines which extended from building to building in an effort to reach new groups of
subscribers.
8. Id at 423. The cable lines which go from the roof of the building down into the
apartments are termed "noncrossover" lines.
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with cable.9
Before 1973, Teleprompter compensated property owners for the
space taken up by the cable at a standard rate of five percent of the
gross revenues that the company derived from the particular prop-
erty.' ° Yet, on January 1, 1973 a new state law-New York Executive
Law section 828' '-went into effect. In order to make cable television
more accessible to New York tenants, the law prohibited all landlords
from interfering with the installation of cable television facilities upon
their premises and made it unlawful for any landlord to demand or
accept compensation in excess of the amount which the New York
State Cable Television Commission' 2 determined by regulation to be
"reasonable." 13 After section 828 was enacted, the State Commission
authorized a one time, one dollar compensation payment to landlords
whose apartment buildings were equipped with cable. Three years af-
ter section 828 became operational, Loretto, demanding more than the
one dollar compensation, brought a class action against Teleprompter
on behalf of all owners of New York State real property on which Tele-
prompter had placed cable facilities.' 4 Loretto, seeking damages for
trespass and an injunction against the continued installation of cable
facilities, alleged that section 828 "constituted a taking without just
compensation in a deprivation of property without due process of
law."' 5
Teleprompter brought a motion for summary judgment which was
granted by the New York Supreme Court, Special Term,' 6 and later
affirmed by its appellate division.'7 The New York Court of Appeals
also affirmed Special Term's ruling' 8 while holding that section 828
was a valid exercise of the state's police power which allowed for the
unhindered development of subscription television in it's important ed-
ucational and community benefits.' 9 The New York Court of Appeals
rejected Loretto's argument that the physical occupation authorized by
9. 53 N.Y.2d at 135, 423 N.E.2d at 324, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
10. 458 U.S. at 423.
11. N.Y. Exec. Law § 828 (McKinney 1982).
12. N.Y. Exec. Law § 814 (McKinney 1982).
13. N.Y. Exec. Law § 828 .b.
14. 53 N.Y.2d at 131, 423 N.E.2d at 322, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
15. Id
16. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 98 Misc.2d 944,415 N.Y.S.2d 180
(1979).
17. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 73 A.D.2d 849, 422 N.Y.S.2d 550
(1979).
18. 53 N.Y.2d at 131, 423 N.E.2d at 332, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
19. 458 U.S. at 875.
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section 828 constituted a taking since the law had no adverse economic
impact on landlords in terms of devaluation of their property.20 Al-
though the majority of the court did not feel that section 828 authorized
a taking, the dissent was adament, stating that the case involved a
"clear instance of a taking requiring just compensation ... ."2, The
dissent believed that even a minimal appropriation of private property
for public use was a taking entitling the owner to just compensation.22
Agreeing with the dissent, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed New York's highest court concluding that section 828 sanc-
tioned a taking of Loretto's property.23 The case then was remanded
back to the New York Court of Appeals to decide the issue of the
amount of compensation that was due Loretto and her fellow property
owners.
24
Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that
the issue in the case was whether section 828, which allowed for an
allegedly minor but permanent physical appropriation of a landlord's
property by a private cable television corporation, constituted a taking
for which just compensation was constitutionally required.25  The
Court concluded that "a permanent physical occupation," sanctioned
by a government, would constitute a taking "without regard to the pub-
lic interest that it may serve, ' ' 26 even if it would only have minimal
economic impact on the owner,27 or even if it would only occupy a
minimal amount of space.2" The Court deduced that section 828 au-
thorized such an occupation of the property and thus constituted a tak-
ing requiring Teleprompter to pay Loretto just compensation.29
The Court was particularly concerned with the serious conse-
quences resulting from the physical intrusion on private property by
government.30 The Court surveyed case law dealing with the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause and classified types of governmental inter-
ference with private ownership into three separate categories:3" 1) per-
20. Id
21. 53 N.Y.2d at 162, 423 N.E.2d at 340, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 863 (1981) (Cooke C.J.,
dissenting).
22. Id at 160, 423 N.E.2d at 339, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
23. 458 U.S. at 441.
24. Id.
25. Id at 421.
26. Id at 426.
27. Id at 435.
28. Id at 436.
29. Id at 441.
30. Id at 426.
31. Id at 441.
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manent physical occupations;32 2) temporary physical invasions;33 and
3) non-physical interferences. 34 If the taking fell within the first cate-
gory, as it did in the instant case, it was deemed aper se compensable
taking, while takings falling within the latter two categories invoked an
application of a test which balanced several important equitable fac-
tors.35 The majority justified the strictper se rule as necessary to pro-
tect a property owner's rights when physical property is permanently
occupied.36 In so doing, the Court subscribed to the opinion that "an
owner suffers a special kind of injury when a stranger directly invades
and occupies the owner's property" because "such an occupation is
qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property...
since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature
of the invasion.
37
The dissent was troubled with Marshall's strained categories of
governmental interference with private ownership and in particular
with the rigid construction of the per se rule for permanent physical
occupation.38 The minority opinion did not approve of the majority's
categories of takings claims, regardless of the type of interference. 39
Thus, the dissent, feeling that the taking in this case was only minimal,
rejected the notion that a property owner has the absolute right to pro-
hibit a relatively minor invasion of his property, especially when a state
has responded to the needs of a new and growing industry by enacting
a statute which attempts to balance the interests of the parties
affected.40
In reversing the New York court, the Supreme Court did not strike
down section 828 as an improper exercise of the state's police power.4'
The Court merely remanded the case to have the state court determine
what constitutes just compensation; in so doing, the Court implied that
the one dollar compensation was not adequate.42 On remand, the New
32. Id at 425-38. See, e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872).
33. Id. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
34. Id at 429-31. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
35. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
36. 458 U.S. at 435. The Court recognized that an owner has the right to possess, the
power to control the use of and the power to dispose of property.
37. Id. at 436.
38. Justice Blackman, writing for the dissent, calls the majority's decision "curiously
anachronistic."
39. 458 U.S. at 441-43. (Blackman, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 455-56.
41. Id at 424-25.
42. Id
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York Court of Appeals modified the Special Term's decision by mak-
ing clear that the New York State Cable Television Commission was
authorized by section 828 to fix reasonable compensation and that the
Commission's regulation 598.3, concerning the limitation period for
service of notice on a property owner, was invalid. The court also re-
tained jurisdiction so that it could later review, if needed, a decision by
the Commission fixing compensation.43 Finally, Loretto was allowed
to maintain an action in trespass arising from Teleprompter's intruding
cable lines, only for the period of time between February 28, 1972, the
date on which she took title to the property in question, and January 1,
1973, the effective date of section 828.44
The difficult question of how to fix just compensation for a perma-
nent physical invasion was left unanswered by the Supreme Court and
was deferred to the State Cable Television Commission by the New
York Court of Appeals. Although the Supreme Court did not give ex-
plicit guidance to the state courts in how to fix compensation, it indi-
rectly narrowed the means that would be available for measuring
compensation.
In remanding the case, the Court implicitly rejected the standard
one dollar compensation approach previously adopted by the Commis-
sion. The Court, likewise, was not moved by the concurring opinion in
the first court of appeals decision which logically suggested that aper se
nominal compensation be awarded landlords unless they could prove
actual damage above the amount of normal compensation. 4' The
Court, however, did not dismiss as false the fact that the taking in-
volved in the case was very minimal and not disruptive of Loretto's
business. This would tend to suggest that Loretto should only be enti-
tled to nominal compensation. Yet, by rejecting the one dollar com-
pensation approach, the Supreme Court suggests that even when no
economic burden is placed on a property owner, minimal compensa-
tion would still have to be greater than the previously awarded nominal
compensation. Finally, the Court's inattention to the compensation is-
sue lends support for not changing its prior preference for the "mar-
ket's" approach to valuation' which would provide for considerably
43. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 143-147, 446 N.E.2d
428, 431, 459 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746 (1983).
44. Id. Loretto's cause of action for trespass subsequent to January 1, 1973 was dis-
missed since Teleprompter's cable facilities were on Loretto's building in accordance with
the law.
45. 53 N.Y.2d at 155, 423 N.E.2d at 336, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 859. (Gabrielli, J.,
concurring).
46. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506 (1979).
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more than one dollar compensation as was available prior to the enact-
ment of section 828.
In the end it will be difficult for the lower courts not to use some
kind of balancing test in setting the rate of compensation. This type of
test, rejected by the Supreme Court for determining aper se taking of
physical property, remains the most practical means of assuring that
the interests of landlords, cable companies and the state as regulator of
the public welfare are all protected. It seems that the rate will have to
be high enough to minimize the sting caused by the intrusion on a
landlord's private property and to uphold the constitutional importance
of the Takings Clause, while at the same time reasonable enough so
that the cable companies do not have to reduce or over-price the
service.
Regardless of what valuation system is adopted, it appears that
this series of litigation will ultimately increase the cost of providing
cable television service. Whether the increased cost to Teleprompter in
compensating landlords for the opportunity to lay cable on their prop-
erty will be passed on to cable television subscribers is not certain.
However, what may be more interesting to watch for is whether New
York eventually amends section 828 to require landlords to install
cable on their property at the request of tenants." Landlords are pres-
ently required to install such things as utility connectors, smoke detec-
tors and fire extinguishers.48 The Court pointed out that in this
situation the landlord would own the cable facilities, thus eliminating
the problem of intrusion by a stranger. By empowering the state to
compel the installation of cable, the need for compensation would be
eliminated.49 Ironically, landlords would be left with little choice but
to lease cable equipment from the cable companies in order to provide
service for their tenants. In this situation, after having vindicated their
constitutional rights in the Teleprompter decision, landlords would be
left bearing some of the cost of providing tenants with pay television
instead of profiting from this new technology.
Remy Kessler
D. Cable T V Industry Challenges Royalty Rate Structure
The Copyright Royalty Tribunal was established as a legislative
47. 458 U.S. at 440 n.19.
48. 458 U.S. at 440.
49. Id
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force designed to create a system of reasonable royalty payments for
the benefit of owners of copyrighted materials which are transmitted
through various media to the public.' Codified in 17 U.S.C. § 801, the
Tribunal's legislative mandate is to promulgate four policies which are
fundamental to the protection and encouragement of creative works:
2
maximizing the availability of creative works to the public; reflecting
economic conditions while providing copyright owners with a fair re-
turn on their investments; maintaining respective roles of owner and
user, and minimizing any potential disruptive impact on industry struc-
tures and practices.' These objectives are an outgrowth of the obvious
conflicts and tensions created by competing communications policies
that are, themselves, based upon tensions evident within article I, sec-
tion 8 of the United States Constitution.4 The national incentive to
broaden knowledge, which forms the basis for the Tribunal's mandate,
is demonstrated through Congressional power to grant exclusive rights
to both creative artists and technicians.5 However, to carry out this
mandate, the Tribunal must also be able to encourage the free flow of
information within the cable television industry.
The FCC began directly regulating the cable television industry in
the 1960's by promoting policies to protect existing broadcasters and
inhibit cable growth in deference to local interests. 6 Broadcasting in-
terests were preferred until 1972 when restrictive regulations were re-
pealed and distant signal carriage and syndicated program exclusivity
restrictions on retransmission via cable were eliminated.7
The fundamental issue which has spawned great controversy
1. Recording Indus. Ass'n of America v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 662 F.2d I (D.C.
Cir. 1981). For general background on the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, see also Copyright
Royalty Tribunal- Achieving Equilibrium Between Cable and Copyright Interests, I Loy. Ent.
L.J. 147 (1981).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(I)(A)-(D) (1977).
3. Id. ; see also Recording Indus., 662 F.2d at 8-9 (discussion of statutory factors consid-
ered by the Tribunal, noting their tension-producing "pull in opposite directions").
4. National Cable Television Ass'n v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 689 F.2d 1077,
1078-79 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The court recognized a "tension" between the Constitutional
grant of exclusivity to creators and the desire to develop generalized knowledge. See also
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (Congress is empowered to "promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries.")
5. Id
6. Malrite T.V. of New York v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140, 1143-44 (2d Cir. 1981); see also
The Copyright Royalty Tribunal- Achieving Equilibrium Between Cable and Copyright Inter-
ests, supra note 1, at 151-54; see also Green, The Cable Television Provisions ofthe Revised
Copyright Act, 27 Cath. U.L. Rev. 263 (1978).
7. See generally Malrite, 652 F.2d at 1144.
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within both the legal community and the cable industry is whether
cable operators should be able to retransmit billion dollar programs
without paying royalties to the underlying copyright owners.8 Until
Congress revised the copyright laws in 1976, the prevalent view was
one of non-liability for cable operators.9 In 1974, when producers and
creators of copyrighted television programs brought an action against
subscription television service operators for copyright infringement
through the interception and relaying of televised materials, the United
States Supreme Court held that the cable operators were not liable for
royalty payments.' 0 The Court based its decision, in part, on an eco-
nomic analysis which viewed market dilution as having little direct im-
pact on the advertising revenues recouped by copyright owners. I Yet,
the Court recognized that turn-of-the-century legislation could no
longer be adequately applied to changing economic and technological
situations. 2
The current legislation, as embodied in the Copyright Act of 1976,
grants secondary transmissions operators' 3 a compulsory license to re-
lay copyrighted materials carried on broadcast stations to subscribing
viewers. 14 Congress provided the compulsory license because it per-
ceived negotiations between each cable television (CATV) system and
the vast number of individual copyright holders as logistically impossi-
ble. 5 However, in exchange for not being forced to obtain the individ-
ual consent of each copyright holder whose rights are exploited, cable
operators must, in turn, remit to copyright owners royalty fees based on
8. 652 F.2d at 1145-46; see also Green, supra Note 6, at 263.
9. Id.
10. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
11. Id at 410-14.
12. Id at 414; see also Eastern Microwave Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F.2d 125,
127 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1232 (1983) where the court notes that it must
"divine and apply the intent of Congress" while confronted with "a statute enacted in the
technological milieu of an earlier time" in order to reflect the "burgeoning technological
advances of the communications industry."
13. A secondary transmission is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 11 1(f) (1976) as the simultaneous
or nonsimultaneous further transmission by a cable system of programming concurrently or
previously conveyed in a primary transmission. Congress additionally asserts through the
Code's circular definition that a primary transmission is one made by a transmitting facility
whose signals are intercepted by a secondary transmission service. Put more succinctly by
Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit, a "'primary transmission' is the initial broadcast; a
'secondary transmission' is the 'further transmitting' of a primary transmission." WGN
Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 1982).
14. See generally Nat'l Cable, 689 F.2d at 1079; see also Eastern Microwave, Inc., 691
F.2d at 128, where the transmission procedure is described.
15. See 17 U.S.C. § 1ll(c)(l) (1977); see Nat'l Cable at 1079-80; and Nat'l Ass'n of
Broadcasters v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675 F.2d 367, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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gross revenues and the number of distant signal equivalents 6 carried
by the system. 7 These fees are paid into a "royalty pool" which the
Tribunal controls, and out of which it pays appropriate shares to the
various classifications of copyright owners who file claims with the
Tribunal. 18
Recognizing that economic factors and industry changes would
necessitate timely modifications of this rate structure, Congress re-
quired, through the Copyright Act, that the Tribunal review rates at
five year intervals beginning on January 1, 1980 at the request of inter-
ested parties.' 9 Clearly, Congress was aware that such an inflexible
timetable could result in unfair royalty rates which could not be recti-
fied until the next rate proceeding. 2° The Copyright Act failed to grant
the Tribunal continuous jurisdiction to monitor royalty rates; rather the
Tribunal is required by the Copyright Act to adhere to a precise and
unwavering schedule. 2' Thus, it would appear that changes in cable
subscription rates and inflation may be reflected only through these pe-
riodic adjustment proceedings.22 However, this potential for unfair
royalty rates is perhaps counteracted by the Administrative Procedure
Act, permitting agency actions to be set aside if they are "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law."' 23 Thus, Tribunal decisions may be overturned if they are found
to have been clearly unreasonable. 24 Accordingly, the Tribunal argua-
bly has the discretion to create a rate schedule linked to a flexible stan-
dard which would permit automatic adjustments, throughout each five
16. Section I I (f) of the Copyright Act defines a distant signal equivalent (DSE) as the
following:
[tihe value assigned to the secondary transmission of any nonnetwork television
programming carried by a cable system in whole or in part beyond the local service
area of the primary transmitter of such programming. It is computed by assigning
a value of one to each independent station and a value of one-quarter to each
network station ....
17 U.S.C. § 11 (f) (1976). Thus, the fee generated reflects the presence and value of copy-
righted materials within varying markets. Id See also Nat'l Cable, 689 F.2d at 1079-80.
17. Id. See also Malrite 652 F.2d at 1144 [cable systems are limited in the transmission
of signals from distant stations according to market size and over-the-air signal availability].
18. Id. at 1080; see also 17 U.S.C. § 11 (d)(2)-(5) (1976).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2)(A); see also Nat'l Cable, 689 F.2d at 1080.
20. Recording Indus., 662 F.2d at 15.
21. Id; see also 17 U.S.C. § 804 (1976).
22. Id However, certain rate adjustments mandated by changes in applicable Federal
Communications Commission rules are permitted.
23. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976); see also Recording Indus., 662 F.2d at 8. The opportu-
nity for judicial review of the Tribunal's decisions by appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 810 (1976).
24. Id
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year hiatus, tied to changes in fixed economic indicators such as the
Consumer Price Index.
The Tribunal's first cable television rate adjustment proceeding
was for the royalty fees rate structure for cable operators benefitting
copyright owners as established by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal.2"
The Copyright Owners, represented by the American Society of Com-
posers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), requested the Tribunal
adopt a six month review mechanism rather than the five year review
provided for in the Act.26 ASCAP argued that a six month review
would permit semi-annual fluctuations in the Consumer Price Index 27
to be reflected in the royalty schedule.28 ASCAP's authority for this
proposed procedure was the Act's requirement that a real constant dol-
lar level be maintained with respect to the royalty fee per subscriber.29
The Tribunal, however, failed to adopt this inflationary adjustment
mechanism.3°
Although the National Cable Television Association claimed rates
were too high and ASCAP asserted that, as a result of the Tribunal's
action, the rates were too low, both raising numerous related issues, the
court of appeals chose to limit its discussion primarily to the Tribunal's
failure to adopt a procedure for semi-annual inflation adjustments.3
In applying the "arbitrary [and] capricious" standard imposed by the
Administrative Procedure Act,3 2 the court found the Tribunal's deter-
mination of the issues to be reasonable and thus sustained its rulings.3 3
The court drew an analogy to the Tribunal's decisions regarding
the royalty rates for phonorecords34 as discussed in Recording Indus-
try.35 There, the Tribunal attempted to create a complex rate adjust-
ment system which would necessitate yearly modifications to reflect
changes in the average retail prices of record albums.36 The court held
25. 689 F.2d 1077.
26. Id at 1081.
27. The Tribunal relied upon the Consumer Price Index to establish the difference be-
tween inflationary increases and the increases in cable subscriber charges, thus forming the
criteria for royalty increases. Id at 1081.
28. Id.
29. Id
30. Id.
31. Id
32. Id at 1091; see also supra note 23.
33. See generally Nat'? Cable, 689 F.2d at 1081. The court held that the Tribunal's
interpretation "of its rate-setting authority [was] reasonable and therefore sustain[ed] its re-
fusal to adopt an inflation adjustment mechanism." Id. at 1081.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) ("phonorecord" defined).
35. Nat'l Cable, 689 F.2d at 1081.
36. Id at 1081-82; see also Recording Indus., 662 F.2d at 2passim.
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that although a periodic exercise of discretion was deliberately limited
by Congress, reasonable automatic mechanisms to reflect rate changes
would be permissible.37 The court also referred to the Seventh Circuit's
analysis of a similar problem regarding royalty rates for jukeboxes in
Amusement and Music Operators Association v. Copyright Royalty Tri-
bunal.3" There, the court held that "a cost of living, or other inflation
adjustment designed to maintain the real value of the fee set by the
Tribunal is not prohibited but is instead affirmatively supported by the
language of the Act."39 However, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that
the jukebox adjustment procedure was automatic in nature, and hence
beyond the Tribunal's discretion and could thus be viewed differently
than the unfixed, discretionary procedure rejected by the court in Re-
cording Industry.
40
In the instant case, ASCAP asserted that their adjustment proposal
would require only semi-annual exercises in arithmetic, and that
mechanical rather than discretionary adjustments would be made.4
The Tribunal's view that its powers were limited by Congress, and that
an adoption of the Owner's proposal would exceed the boundaries out-
lined by Congressional policy, was found to be reasonable. 42 The court
concluded, however, that the Tribunal was free to treat each industry
on an individual basis43 since the Tribunal's rate making authority dif-
fers with respect to the various industries covered by the Act. 4 Thus,
with respect to cable rates, the Tribunal is free to simply monitor fees at
five year intervals.45 The court reasoned that since Congress could
have but did not require the Tribunal to undertake this task yearly to
account for changes in subscriber charges and inflation rates, it could
be inferred that monitoring sooner than the express five year intervals
would be contrary to Congressional intent.46
The court postulated that a decrease in the efficacy of business
planning might plague the cable industry if forced to speculate on
37. Id. at 16-17; see generally Nat'l Cable, 689 F.2d at 1081-82.
38. Nat'l Cable, 689 F.2d at 1082; see also Amusement and Music Operators Ass'n v.
Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 679 F.2d 1144 (7th Cir. 1982).
39. Id. at 1155.
40. Id. at n.9.
41. See generally Nat 7 Cable, 689 F.2d at 1082-83.
42. Id. at 1083.
43. Id. at 1084 (e.g., phonorecord and jukebox rates are adjusted according to a ten year,
rather than a five year schedule).
44. Id.
45. Id
46. Id
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semi-annual rate adjustments as they are potentially uncertain. 47 The
court concluded that because of this danger, heightened by the relative
youth of the cable industry, the Congressional plan should be followed
until further knowledge is provided by legal and cable industry devel-
opment.48 This knowledge, once gained, can form the basis for change
in the rate structure.49 Additionally, the court pointed out that to some
extent inflationary increases in cable subscriber charges will be passed
to copyright owners although at a less precise rate.5°
The Tribunal measured the increase in subscription rates since
1976 in relation to the Consumer Price Index.5" Based upon service
charge reports supplied by CATV operators, the Tribunal found that
between 1976 and 1980 subscription rates had lagged behind inflation
considerably. 52 The NCTA contended that 1976 figures should be
used, asserting that royalty fees had, in fact, increased at the same rate
as inflation since that time.5 3 However, the court held that the Tribu-
nal's estimate, which was based on actual subscriber charges for 1976,
was both reasonable and reliable, and was therefore to be upheld.54
The Copyright Owners also argued that certain tiering practices
utilized by cable operators to manipulate rates charged for cable sub-
scription would deprive them of fees earned on secondary transmis-
sions and thus should be reflected in the rate schedule.55 They argued
that cable operators might lower the charge for basic service as an in-
ducement to customers, understating the revenues gained from basic
subscription services and thereby deprive the Owners of higher royalty
47. Id. at 1085-86.
48. Id
49. Id
50. Id. at n.66, at 1090-9 1. For this reason, a portion of the case was remanded with the
desire that the Tribunal explain or correct the absence of a mathematical adjustment to
compensate for the difference between 1976 dollars used in calculations and the 1980 dollars
upon which the rate structure was applied. The court asserted that "Irloyalty fees will retain
their dollar value precisely to the extent that subscriber charges rise with inflation." Both
the NCTA and ASCAP suggested that the percentage difference between the 1976 and 1980
figures be converted to reflect 1980 dollars.
51. Id at 1088.
52. Id
53. Id. at 1088-89 nr.85, 86. The NCTA relied on the House Judiciary Committee's
report that stated rates would approximate 81 cents per subscriber per year. H.R. Rep. No.
1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 175 (1976). The NCTA contended that the 1980 fee per sub-
scriber was approximately $1.10, thus reflecting the same approximate 33 percent increase in
inflation during that same period.
54. Id at 1089.
55. Id. at 1086-88. Tiering occurs where cable operators offer one rate for basic distant
signal importation services and a higher rate for "pay" services such as sports and movie
channels in the hope of attracting customers with the initial charge for basic service.
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fees.56 The Tribunal, however, accepted the NCTA's evidence that
tiering "was virtually non-existent during the 1976-1980 time period
under review."" They also accepted the NCTA's contention that, since
pay television services attract new basic subscribers and make the in-
troduction of cable systems into new markets economically feasible,
tiering actually augmented rather than undercut Owners' royalty base
by tiering.5 8 The court accepted the Tribunal's findings, stating that it
had acted reasonably within its discretionary range and that a reflec-
tion of tiering practices was unnecessary.5 9
The court recognized that although even fractional percentage
shifts in the rate schedule could result in the gain or loss of millions of
dollars to either party, it must view the Tribunal's rate-setting and dis-
bursement efforts with deference. 6 The court suggested that the assess-
ment of technical developments and the formulation of legislative
policy are beyond the scope of its authority and competence where
such judgments have been "entrusted to politically-accountable institu-
tions. ' 6  Although the court admonished the Tribunal for its partial
failure to set out its findings clearly, it held the Tribunal's conclusions
to be reasonable.
62
Subsequent to the FCC's repeal of restrictive rules regarding dis-
tant signal carriage and syndicated program exclusivity,63 the Copy-
right Royalty Tribunal amended its rule establishing royalty rates for
secondary transmissions and established an additional royalty fee
schedule for secondary transmissions programming and signals that
were not carried prior to June 24, 198 1.6 This occurred in response to
the NCTA's filing of a petition on behalf of cable operators to initiate
such a fee adjustment proceeding with the Tribunal.65 The NCTA's
petition, filed on August 11, 1981, caused the Tribunal to direct those
parties interested to submit comments for the Tribunal's consideration
at the proceeding herein discussed.66 A petition for the commencement
56. Id at 1087 n.77.
57. Id. at 1088.
58. Id at 1088 n.81.
59. Id.
60. Id at 1091.
61. Id.
62. Id
63. See generaly Malrite, 652 F.2d 1140; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
64. Adjustments of the Royalty Rate for Cable Systems; Federal Communications Com-
mission's Deregulation of the Cable Industry, 47 Fed. Reg. 52, 146 (1982) (codified at 37
C.F.R. §§ 308.1-308.2 (1983)).
65. Id.
66. Id.
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of proceedings to adjust compulsory license fees was also filed by AS-
CAP on September 24, 1981.67 The Motion Picture Association of
America (MPAA) subsequently filed with the Tribunal a request for a
ruling on the effective date of liability for rate adjustments.68 From
June 15 to July 22 of 1982, the Tribunal conducted hearings allowing
the NCTA and the copyright owners to present their cases through var-
ious witnesses.69
Responding to the Tribunal's initial request for comments on the
NCTA petition, comments were filed by the MPAA, the National As-
sociation of Broadcasters (NAB), ASCAP, Broadcast Music, Inc.
(BMI), and the NCTA. Additionally, remarks were filed by Major
League Baseball, the National Basketball Association (NBA), the Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), the National Hockey
League, and the North American Soccer League, these parties being
referred to as "Joint Sports Claimants. ' 70 Arguments presented by the
various parties were centered primarily on the three issues: 1) the pre-
cise percentage demarcations to be utilized in the royalty rate schedule;
2) the possibility of periodic inflation adjustments in the determined
rates; and 3) the date at which any rate increases should become effec-
tive.71 The evidentiary positions of the parties with respect to these
issues were summarized by the Tribunal prior to its discussion and
determinations.72
The MPAA submitted a rate schedule proposing fees equal to five
percent of gross cable receipts for each distant signal equivalent on new
signals plus an additional fractionalized percentage based on the size of
a CATV's market resulting from the FCC's deregulation of distant sig-
nals and the repeal of syndicated exclusivity rules.73 The MPAA also
proposed that the Tribunal provide for periodic inflation adjustments,
and that the operative date of any rate increases be July 1, 198 L" The
testimony of ten witnesses was presented to the Tribunal for its
consideration.75
The testimony of Dr. Bridger Mitchell, an independent economic
consultant and senior research economist for Rand Corporation, as-
67. Id.
68. Id at 52,147 (the MPAA's request was filed on October 19 of the same year).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 52,146.
71. Id.
72. Id at 52,147-52.
73. Id at 52,147.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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serted that increased cable profits in urban markets were caused by the
FCC's elimination of restrictive regulations, the advent of new satellite
technology reducing signal transmission costs, and the increased num-
bers of available programming sources.76 Dr. Mitchell maintained that
CATV systems were thereby able to profitably retain subscribers and
save blackout and substitution expenses.77
ASCAP and BMI, referred to as "Joint Music" by the Tribunal,
had requested that a periodic rate adjustment be adopted to reflect in-
flation, and that any rate increases become effective on July 1, 1981 .
The Managing Director of ASCAP, Ms. Gloria Messinger, testified that
license fees received by Joint Music for the performance of music were
based on the gross revenues of the local television stations which use
the material.7 9 Ms. Messinger further testified that, assuming that
viewing audience diversion occurs because of distant signal competi-
tion with local stations local gross revenues are therefore reduced ulti-
mately harming copyright holders.80 Additional testimony supplied by
Dr. David E. Black, Associate Chairman of the Department of Eco-
nomics at the University of Delaware, suggested that the compulsory
license royalty fees should be 10.8 times higher to reflect the value
placed on music by broadcasters."1
It was proposed by NAB that a rate of five percent of gross receipts
for basic service on each distant signal equivalent added in response to
FCC deregulation be assessed. 2 The testimony of Dr. Lawrence Pat-
rick, NAB's Vice President for Research, suggested that local station
revenue losses were not offset by the gain of new distant audiences.83
He also testified that to reasonably compensate broadcast stations for
these revenue losses, rates would have to be increased between 16.5 and
22.5 times.8 4
Joint Sports' proposal mirrored that of the NAB, requesting a rate
of five percent of cable's gross receipts per distant signal equivalent.8 5
The Executive Director of Marketing and Broadcasting in the Office of
the Commissioner of Baseball, Mr. Thomas Villante, testified that in a
76. Id at 52,148.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 52,149.
79. Id.
80. Id
81. Id
82. Id
83. Id
84. Id
85. Id
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free marketplace, copyright payments sought and obtained for profes-
sional sports programming would be no lower than those received from
the USA Network, and no higher than those received from local cable
systems. He also asserted that, absent compulsory licenses, CATV pay-
ments for baseball programming would be approximately .5 cents per
subscriber per game at a minimum, with the maximum payment being
twenty to twenty-five cents per subscriber per game.86 Further, he as-
serted that copyright holders' current revenues for similar program-
ming are "substantially lower" than CATV's revenues.87
This assertion was reiterated by Dr. Yale Braunstein, Director of
the Senior Research Association at Kalbas Bowen Associates, who said
that increasing distant signal rates by fifteen times would be necessary
to compensate copyright owners to the same extent they would be com-
pensated in a free marketplace.88 He also felt that a royalty rate based
on five percent of gross receipts for each additional distant signal
equivalent would be reasonable.89
The NCTA submitted to the Tribunal an adjusted fee schedule
reflecting the view that no periodic inflation adjustment should be
adopted.9" The Executive Vice President and Treasurer of Liberty
Communications, Inc., Ms. Carolyn Chambers, testified that compari-
sons between broadcast and cable television for rate determination
would prove misleading due to the functional differences between the
two types of services.9' Ms. Michelle Minarcin, NCTA's Director of
Research, attempted to show that only a small number of previously
prohibited signals have been added by cable systems subsequent to de-
regulation, and that those signals which were added failed to contribute
significantly to increased penetration or rate growth.92 She also noted
that despite greater cable penetration, broadcast revenues have contin-
ued to enjoy dramatic growth.
93
86. Id. at 52,150.
87. Id.
88. Id
89. Id.
90. Id According to the NCTA, where statutory DSE rates within the tiered rate struc-
ture prior to deregulation by the FCC were 0.675 of 1 percent, and the rates within the top
fifty television markets were 0.872 of I percent, the comparable rate for new distant signals
should now be I percent. Similarly, where the pre-deregulation rates were 0.485 and 0.432
of I percent respectively, the suggested rate for new distant signals is 0.550 of I percent. Id
91. Id. Ms. Chambers asserted that the narrow casting capability of cable, as well as its
multichannel retransmission capacity and two way technology make it markedly different
from broadcast television. Non-entertainment and non-broadcast cable services and capa-
bilities also make comparisons between cable and broadcast television invalid.
92. Id at 52,150-51.
93. Id
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Additionally, the testimony of the NCTA's Vice President for Me-
dia Services and Research, Ms. Char Beales, attempted to show that the
marginal value of each additional programming channel declines, as
distant signal market shares attracts a diminishing.94 She also asserted
that audiences of both advertiser supported and pay programming are
projected to grow dramatically, and that expanded cable audiences
generate supplemental advertiser revenues.95
Dr. Rolla E. Park, Senior Economist at Rand Corporation, offered
testimony that the only relevant marketplace in which to approximate
the effect of a free market place on cable rates is one for distant signals
bought by CATV systems. Sports programming purchased by both the
USA Network and broadcast stations, in Dr. Park's view, created inva-
lid market place analogies. 96 It was Dr. Park's analysis and resulting
fee schedule which was ultimately submitted by the NCTA to the Tri-
bunal as a suggested rate adjustment format. 97
The Tribunal adopted a motion which stated that it has both the
authority and jurisdiction to consider and set royalty fees for additional
programming and signals. 98 It further asserted that it was not con-
strained to follow the original statutory rates suggested by the Copy-
right Act, although it would, where relevant, analyze the relationship
between the statutory schedule and newly adopted rates.99 Thus, the
Tribunal considered the economic impact on both owners and users of
copyrighted materials in an effort to make necessary rate adjustments
94. Id It was also noted that where CATV systems have twelve or more channel capac-
ity, the impact of additional signals on gaining new subscribers is minimal. Further, the
prices paid by local broadcasters for syndicated programming are insignificantly effected
cable penetration, Ms. Beales asserted.
95. Id
96. Id Dr. Park identified significant market place differences between the products
being purchased and the uses to which they were put, as well as in the sources of generated
revenue, which make cable and broadcast markets incomparable. Although no free market
for distant signals exists, he felt that a model of such a market could be constructed for
purpose of analogy.
97. Id. See also supra n.90 and accompanying text.
98. Id. at 52,152 (the motion was adopted on March 31, 1982). The Tribunal also noted
that the legal analysis and jurisdictional stance herein largely resemble those which it took
in Nat'l Cable; the court of appeals fully affirmed the Tribunal's conclusions in that case.
See Nat'/ Cable, 689 F.2d 1077 (1982).
99. See Adjustments of the Royalty Rate, 47 Fed. Reg. 2, 152 (1982). The Tribunal
stated that "[n]either the rates in copyright law nor the legislative history limit our adjust-
ment of the rates for those signals and programs within the scope of this proceeding," and
that such conclusions have been uniformly upheld on judicial review. Id See, e.g., Nat
Cable, 689 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Amusement and Music Operators Ass'n v. Copyright
Royalty Tribunal, 676 F.2d 1144 (7th Cir. 1982).
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that reflected alterations in FCC restrictions. l°°
The Tribunal noted that, according to members of the cable indus-
try, CATV systems would probably refrain from distant signal carriage
rather than pay copyright royalty fees thereby effectively reinvoking
original FCC restrictions on distant signals.'10 The Tribunal disagreed,
reasoning that it would be up to each cable operator to make a "busi-
ness judgment" within "the reasonable marketplace" regarding the po-
tential benefits of distant signal carriage. The Tribunal found that
fears that CATV systems would refuse to pay royalties were unsup-
ported. Thus, the "reasonable" value of copyrighted programming
should be reflected in royalty fees.' Further, any programming lost to
the public would be insignificant since, although much programming is
presently duplicated, a wealth of alternative programming is readily
available. 3
In an effort to "strike a balance between copyright owner and
user," the Tribunal set rates "while also remembering that only the
cable operator has freedom of choice in this congressional mandated
marriage.'"" The Tribunal further asserted that the development of
the cable industry should not be subsidized by copyright owners; in-
stead, the new rates will decrease CATV profitability levels.'0 5 Re-
jecting the NCTA's argument that subscribers would not willingly pay
added costs for distant signals, the Tribunal found that the marketplace
alone, rather than these "speculations," held the final answer. 1
06
The Tribunal clearly acknowledged the inaccuracy, inconsistency
and unreliability of much of the data upon which it was to base its
rulings.0 7 However, it concluded that the fee imposed was not burden-
some, and that other past cost increases have been absorbed by the
cable industry without any "disruptive impact."'0 8 The Tribunal ac-
100. The Tribunal also found it noteworthy that complete elimination of FCC distant
signal carriage and syndicated program exclusivity restrictions were previously unantici-
pated. See Adjustment of the Royalty Rate at 47 Fed. Reg. 52,152.
101. Id at 52,153.
102. Id. The Tribunal felt that the limited public harm caused by cable operators drop-
ping programming should not stand in the way of their adopting a reasonable marketplace
valuation scheme.
103. Id
104. Id
105. Id
106. Id at 52,154.
107. Id The Tribunal noted that out-dated data, studies which partially relied upon in-
tuition and speculative conclusions, and comparisons between dissimilar distant signal cable
markets and broadcast sports network markets in which programmer control varies made
decision-making on their part more difficult.
108. Id. at 52,157.
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knowledged that" [clable systems will reap some benefits and the copy-
right owners will suffer some harm as a result" of their actions, but to a
lesser extent than that anticipated by the copyright owners. °9 Thus,
rates requested by the copyright owners were revised downward by the
Tribunal."' A tiered fee system was created with staggered rates re-
flecting market share, signal age and signal availability. No mecha-
nism was provided for cost of living adjustments."' An effective date of
January 1, 1983 was established by the Tribunal, having found that
business decisions regarding signal carriage in light of rate changes
should be informed ones, and thus should not be imposed for periods
preceding their decision." 2
Faced with the job of resolving contradictory evidence while keep-
ing in mind equally elusive goals, the Tribunal's task was assuredly a
difficult one. With the ultimate ideal of ensuring "a continuing supply
of varied programming to viewers," the Tribunal must use "the real
world of telecommunications" as a backdrop for decision-making. "3 If
diversity of programming is indeed an important regulatory desire, per-
haps the potential inadequacies and inequalities of a cable pricing sys-
tem may be ultimately overshadowed.' ' 4
Clearly, the same programming limitations imposed directly and
indirectly on "free" television have the potential of similarly affecting
the cable market. As audience size and advertising revenues begin to
gain importance in a realm which is presently characterized by narrow
casting and audience segmentation, cable must ultimately take on
many of the programming attributes of free television in order to pros-
per. The interplay of new technological advances and economic con-
straints will surely result in a continuous shifting of costs and benefits
among the parties involved. The rates set by the Tribunal must there-
fore be closely monitored and modified to reflect these fluctuations, for
technologies are rapidly developing which go far beyond mere imagi-
nation, and thus surpass present regulatory insights; the delicate bal-
ance between copyright owners and cable interests is easily shifted.'
109. Id. at 52,158.
110. Id.
11. Id at 52,158-59 for text of the rates.
112. Id
113. See Eastern Microwave, Inc., 691 F.2d at 132.
114. See Malrite, 652 F.2d at 1151.
115. E.g., the present availability of satellite dishes for individual consumers enabling
them to receive and view virtually any signal sent from a broadcast satellite free of charge,
and direct broadcast satellites which can bypass cable systems and transmit signals directly
to individual homes are just two such technological advances which, although "futuristic" in
nature, are here today.
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But market stability must not be sacrificed in an effort to keep royalty
schedules up to date, for this could result in making business planning
for CATV operation next to impossible. The only certainty in the in-
dustry is that "as the size of the [royalty] Fund grows, the dispute over
how to slice the pie may be[come] more vigorous .. " ,,116 Indeed,
"[riatemaking is an art, not a science";" 7 the adjusted rates established
by the Tribunal are at present neither arbitrary or unreasonable, and
will no doubt serve adequately until future rate adjustment
proceedings.
Lynda Goldman
116. Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675 F.2d 367, 385 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
117. Amusement and Music Operators, 679 F.2d at 1159.
[Vol. 4
